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ABSTRACT
In this paper we present an approach for the integration of cyberse-
curity tools from multiple domains into an overall risk assessment
framework which takes the complex interactions between domains
in smart grid systems into account. e approach is based on gener-
ating hypotheses from a template, which are then analyzed for their
probability and associated impact on the system. e feasibility of
the proposed approach is discussed using a very simple example
case to serve as a proof of concept. Furthermore, we introduce
a generic soware framework for the processing of hypothesis
templates.
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1 INTRODUCTION
e operation of electrical distribution grids, as seen from the utility
control center, is centered around the SCADA and DMS systems
in place. In practice this means that the operator in the control
center achieves situational awareness about the state of the physi-
cal infrastructure through a combination of online monitoring and
partly oine decision support tools available in the control center.
e severity of threats to power system security of supply is eval-
uated continuously, quantied by assessment tools that integrate
operational data delivered by the SCADA system with background
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knowledge on the present system conguration. Examples of such
tools are state estimators, contingency screening and real-time
security indicators.
In a dierent context, but similar situation, utilities have increas-
ingly been facing cyber-threats and aacks on the ICT backbones
of the systems named above. Utilities have increasingly engaged in
building cyber-oriented active and passive defense mechanisms and
infrastructure, to keep (at least) the central OT safe from external
threats. A deeper understanding of possible penetration depth in
the utility IT and OT systems can be achieved by architecture as-
sessment systems (such as CySeMoL). Such and other tools facilitate
proactive defense-in-depth strategies on the eld of cybersecurity
threats and countermeasures. However, it is not trivial to assess
the potential impact of cyber aacks on the security of supply.
Considering increasing frequency and sophistication of aacks,
it cannot be assumed that the central operational systems will
always be safe, even with continuously improving cyber defenses.
It is evident that cyber aacks aimed at physical supply disruptions
are not only imaginable, but a real possibility [23].
e point of departure for the present work is the understand-
ing that utilities in the near future need to be able to assess the
potential impact on the security of supply caused by cyber aacks.
Furthermore, operators need to respond quickly — ideally in real
time — to new threats as they appear. To be able to do this, new
tools are needed to map out and prioritize their response to these
threats.
is need is becoming more pronounced due to the proliferation
of smart grid technologies, i.e. a trend towards a higher degree of
automation in the power grid and the deployment of automation
solutions in areas of the grid which were previously not connected
to communication networks, such as customer meters, building
automation systems and the control of distributed energy resources
(DER). While power grids and the ICT systems needed for their
operation have traditionally been treated as separate infrastruc-
tures, smart grids have to be analyzed as cyber-physical systems.
Consequently, IT security is only one aspect of the cybersecurity
of smart grids.
e SALVAGE project aims at developing and integrating anal-
ysis methods which are behind three domain-specic tools. ey
provide a quantication of cybersecurity vulnerability, probability
of an ongoing intrusion and power system impact. One key chal-
lenge is how to combine these three types of information, which
are of very diverse nature, into an integrated analysis of the present
system state. Another challenge is how to go about stepwise au-
tomation of such an analysis, in the light of the very large amounts
of data which need to be analysed.
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In this paper, we present an approach based on automated hy-
pothesis testing. We discuss the premises and core concepts of
the chosen approach, then present an example for a very simple
cyber-physical system as a proof of concept. Finally, we discuss the
implementation of the concept in a soware framework, the devel-
opment of which has been one of the activities in the SALVAGE
project. We conclude with a brief discussion of the next steps to be
taken.
2 RELATEDWORK
e cyber-physical systems perspective has received increasing
aention from the smart grids community [10, 17]. e range of
approaches includes purely analytical methods to aack detection
[13], system modelling and (co-)simulation [9], formal methods for
security assessment [3] or test specication [21].
Anomaly detection identies rare data instances or events that do
not match an expected paern [2]. e development of models used
for anomaly detection requires domain expertise, and additionally,
if data driven models are required, data analysis knowledge. Model-
based approaches for anomaly detection can be based on Bayesian
networks [7]. Once both cyber and physical anomaly detection
analysis is performed, cyber-physical metrics need to be developed
to combine the information from both domains and address the tight
relations between the power system and the ICT domains. Anomaly
detection with regression models has been used for discovering
cyber aacks on a SCADA system [20], wind turbine fault detection
[22] and photovoltaic plant fault diagnostics [14]. A special case of
an aack against voltage control in distribution power grids has
been described in [5].
A number of methods can be used to assess the cyber-vulnera-
bility of IT and OT architectures such as those enabling the auto-
mated control and operation of the smart grid. Examples include
methods for traditional human-performed information security risk
asseessments (e.g., FAIR [18] or HMG IA [11]), and risk assessments
tailored for the smart grid (e.g., SGIS Toolbox [1]). ere also exist
approaches and tools to automate vulnerability assessment, mostly
based on aack graphs [6, 15], such as MulVAL [12], ADVISE [8],
CyberSAGE [19] or CySeMoL [4, 16]. Many of the established and
standardized methods for risk assessment are being used in the
industry, and can lead to accurate results when used by skilled
professionals. However, their use requires much eort each time an
assessment is being performed. e aack graph based approaches
are less labor-intensive, since much of the analysis is performed
by a computer; however, tend to require a human to formulate the
ontology of how aacks may happen (i.e., aack steps, transitions
between them, and dependencies of the transitions). CySeMoL has
the advantage of being such an ontology, aiming to be compre-
hensive, generic, and even having undergone scientic scrutiny.
Hence, it has been chosen as one of the tools used by the framework
presented below.
3 PROPOSED APPROACH
Traditionally, and from the point of view of a control room oper-
ator in an electrical power system, the ICT aspect of the power
system (which includes the SCADA and DMS systems) has not been
part of the system to be operated; it was an infrastructure which
was assumed to work. Today, the ICT domain (both OT and IT)
is explicitly taken into account during operations. However, the
pure ICT risk assessment still tends to separate security relevant
events from ICT and physical domains. Our approach assumes
an operational context in which the risk of several cyber-security
breaches are evaluated at the same time, and where there is highly
uncertain information about possible security breaches. In such a
context only an integrated assessment is meaningful, where a risk-
oriented prioritization of potential threats and impacts is required
to accommodate probabilistic information.
3.1 Background
Cross-dependencies between domains make it hard to isolate the
impact analysis of the physical and cyber domains. Consequences
of IT-domain breaches which manifest themselves in the physical
domain, are not quantiable using the same metrics as a pure analy-
sis of the IT domain. Furthermore, the model types and propagation
mechanisms are dierent in each of these domains. Dierent prop-
agation mechanisms make a direct model integration impossible;
a coupling of models could however be achieved, similar to the
strategy for co-simulation approaches. A pure co-simulation based
assessment would however require a full model parametrization,
simulation of combined models and result assessment. Probabilistic
input hypotheses and dependencies would still not be feasible in
such an approach. Nevertheless, the good success of probabilistic
modeling in – for example – intrusion detection or ICT architecture
assessment (CySeMol), indicates that uncertain knowledge from
several domains can successfully be combined. Aack modeling
methods based on probabilistic methods and tree structure are quite
successful [6].
However, aack probability alone does not constitute sucient
information if the goal is to be able to prioritize the response to
several aack scenarios. e impact quantity, i.e. the consequence
of an aack in terms of the physical system, is of equal importance.
Calculating the overall risk of a particular aack scenario (as a
function of probability and potential impact) cannot be done with-
out integrating an impact analysis into the vulnerability analysis
process, which is necessarily domain-specic.
3.2 Problem Statement: Key requirements
We see a need for a framework that performs a real time (online)
integrated assessment of the state of the power grid, using aspects
from multiple domains (power system impact, intrusion detection,
cyber vulnerability) and multiple sources of input (power system
measurements, distributed energy resources (DERs), IT and OT
systems) – a framework that aims to provide a joint prioritization
of possible threat/impact-scenarios, taking into account uncertainty
of input information.
We see that an automated, integrated assessment has the poten-
tial to yield more accurate results than performing several separate
assessments whose results need to be interpreted and nally merged
and synthesized by a human. e strength of the integrated as-
sessment resides in (1) the possibility to handle dependencies that
cross boundaries of dierent domains in an automated fashion and
already during the assessment process; and hence (2) the ability
of the framework to operate in real time (online assessment), and
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therefore the ability to provide frequent re-assessments based on
an actual state of the power grid and its IT/OT infrastructure.
3.3 Core Concepts
Figure 1: Domain interactions
e System conguration is the model of the underlying system
that is being evaluated – including the power grid, distributed
energy resources aached to it, and all relevant pieces of IT/OT
infrastructure that govern and/or otherwise interact with any and
all of the former.
e term Domain, in the context of this paper, is referring to
one of the following: cyber security/vulnerability, DER intrusion
detection, or power system [impact] analysis. Figure 1 shows the re-
lationships between the domains, expressed in terms of the possible
ows of information between them.
A Domain-specic assessment (DSA) is a quantication (func-
tion) obtained from a computational component. For a given input
parametrization, the DSA quanties one or several (branching!)
pairs of a probability (p) and a dierent quantity (a Domain specic
variable, e.g. electric current, operating state, switch state). e
input parametrization may include both static parameters (e.g. sys-
tem congurations), dynamic online data (e.g. meter readings), and
other [dynamic] invocation parameters (e.g. state of a particular
switch or function). Example: e.g. given a certain state to occur
(DER on or o), what is the quantitative impact (power distribution),
and what is the chance of it occcuring.
Domain specic variable (DSV) is a quantity (an intermediate
or nal impact value, e.g. electric current) that is specic to a
DSA, and can be obtained by the DSA, and may be a (partial) input
parametrization of another DSA.
A Hypothesis template is a tree-like structural representation
(strictly taken, an acyclic directed graph) of the following:
(1) An “aack tree” in form of a probability tree using logical
gates, which aggregates probabilistic data from DSA inputs
at its leaf level all the way up to the top-level probability
of the assessed realism of a hypothesized scenario;
(2) A set of domain-specic variables (DSVs, e.g. power supply
loss due to opening of a specic breaker) related to a system
conguration – the “output quantities” of DSAs, which,
according to the structure of the hypothesis template, ulti-
mately contribute to the risk value (the aggregated product
of partial probabilities and impacts) of the hypothesized
scenario. e DSVs can be dened together with an “input
parameterization” of a DSA, since the DSA might need to
be dynamically invoked with the output parameters of an-
other DSA (instead of the baseline system conguration);
(3) e coupling of output probabilities of each DSA to the
probability tree (through logical gates such as AND, OR,
XOR and NOT);
(4) e coupling of DSA outputs with invocations of other
DSAs (at a higher level in the tree), leading to a nal sce-
nario quantication.
e Risk node is a node used as the root node of a hypothesis
template, joining the nal impact quantity (associated with an
aack goal) with the nal hypothesis probability into a single,
overall risk value of the (grounded) hypothesis.
A Risk belief is the quantied risk value of a hypothesis (hypoth-
esized scenario).
eHypothesis probability (belief) is a fully quantied probability
value of a hypothesis.
Figure 2 illustrates the concepts dened above and their relations.
In a hypothesis, probabilities and other quantities are aggregated
through functional gates all the way up to the root value of a
hypothesis which represents its risk value, i.e. the product of the
impact of an adverse event and its probability.
Figure 2: Conceptual structure of a hypothesis template and
resolution
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4 PROOF OF CONCEPT
4.1 e fuse blowing scenario
In the following, we will demonstrate the feasibility of the above
approach. As discussed in section 3.1, (say something about that
the thing to be demonstrated is not the ability of the method to
handle large power systems but multiple domains). We use the test
system shown in gure 3 which represents a multi-domain system
while keeping the complexity within the individual domains at
an absolute minimum, i.e. a simple grid conguration, simple IT
network and simple DER behaviour. e test grid conguration
consists of a PV inverter connected to an electrical power grid of in-
nite capacity. e inverter can be remote controlled from a laptop
(equipped with remote-control soware) through a minimalistic
communication network consisting of a direct, unswitched ethernet
connection between a laptop and the controllable inverter. A single
inverter function is available through the remote-control interface:
Switching the inverter on — which would cause the inverter to feed
power to the grid, depending on current solar irradiation — or o,
which would reduce the current owing between inverter and grid
to exactly zero. e cable between inverter and grid is protected
by an innitely small fuse (here: 1µA) , such that the fuse would
inevitably blow and disconnect the inverter from the grid as soon as
the inverter is switched on. is reduces the range of possible grid
impacts of a cyberaack to a binary choice: Turning the inverter
on will result in permanent damage to the system; the associated
need for repair is easily quantiable in terms of nancial damage.
e only alternative action is to leave the inverter in the o state,
which has no consequences.
Figure 3: Fuse blow scenario
4.2 Processing the fuse blow scenario
Applying the method described in section 3.3 results in the hypoth-
esis template shown in gure 4.
Starting at the boom of the tree, the rst two inputs to the re-
solver are the outputs of the DER intrusion detection tool [DER-IDS]
and the vulnerability analysis tool [IT]. Combined, they express
the probability of the inverter having been compromised. At the
next level, the actions of the aacker must be considered; speci-
cally what the aacker intends to do with the compromised system.
Due to the design of the test case, the aacker has only two op-
tions available: switch the inverter on, or leave it o. ese two
options, while the probabilities for their respective occurrences
may be known, lead to a widely dierent outcome for the physical
system. erefore, two dierent hypotheses must be generated
from the hypothesis template, and each outcome must be evaluated
separately. For each hypothesis, the response of the inverter to
aacker behaviour must be evaluated using a component model
of the inverter [DER-CM]. e output of the component model is
twofold and consists of (a) the magnitude of the electrical current at
the inverter terminals in case of the inverter switching on, and (b)
the probability of the inverter switching on aer receiving a remote
switching command. e current magnitude is then inserted into a
system model [PS] which calculates the line ow between inverter
and grid connection, thereby determining the current through the
fuse. By comparing this result with the fuse characteristics, it can
be transformed into the probability of an inverter operation causing
a fuse blow, which in turn can be combined with the probability
of an inverter operation to yield the probability of a fuse blow. In-
dependent of the laer, deduction-based result, a blown fuse may
also be observed by a system monitoring the state of the physical
system in real time [SSM]. e disjunction of both yields the over-
all probability of a blown fuse. Multiplication with the calculated
impact — here expressed as the nancial damage caused by the
required replacement of the fuse — yields the risk value.
e scenario presented above is very simplistic. Nevertheless,
the application of more complex scenarios is not expected to lead
to notably greater tree depths in the hypothesis template. Rather,
they will lead to increased width of the trees, as the multiplicity of
components in a physical system is taken into account. A practical
assessment system would be built around a library of hundreds
or thousands of dierent hypothesis templates and perform re-
evaluation on a continuous basis. is would provide a human
operator or another information system with a frequently updated
set of the most threatening scenarios according to the present state
of the power grid and its cyber infrastructure.
5 PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION
As part of the SALVAGE project, the process of hypothesis gener-
ation (expansion) from a hypothesis template, as well as the eval-
uation and ranking of multiple hypotheses, has been automated
by developing a generic framework. Figure 5 shows the high-level
architecture of this framework. A hypothesis template (represented
by a hierarchically structured le) is given as input to a hypothesis
generator. e generator analyzes the template and extracts a list
of branch points which require expansion into multiple hypothe-
ses. Furthermore, the generator identies the type of information
represented by the root node and instantiates an appropriate rank-
ing algorithm for this type of node. As a next step, the generator
expands the template at all nb branch points by lling in one of the
possible states at each branch point, thus sequentially generating
2nb hypotheses. Currently, this simple brute-force approach to hy-
pothesis generation/expansion is the only available strategy. Each
hypothesis is being forwarded to a resolver module which must
match the hypothesis template. e resolver module traverses the
tree and identies the dependencies between ordinary tree nodes
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Figure 4: Hypothesis template for the fuse blow hypothesis
and data obtained by executing one of the domain-specic tools (e.g.
a power system impact analysis). At each point of the tree traverse
where such external input is needed, a data request is forwarded to
the tool orchestrator module which coordinates the execution of
one or more domain-specic tools, prepares the input data for these
tools and collects their output. e execution of each individual
tool is encapsulated into an executor module to isolate the rest of
the framework from tool-specic execution modes such as shell
invocations, platform dependencies etc. Once the tree has been
traversed, the value of the root node is passed on to the ranking
module, which applies the ranking criteria provided by the hypoth-
esis generator. e ranking module will only terminate when the
last hypothesis has been generated and resolved. Its output is a list
of (the highest ranking) hypothesis ordered by their risk value.
Figure 5: Framework architecture and data ow
6 CONCLUSION
In the above paper we have discussed and presented an approach
for the integration of cybersecurity tools from multiple domains
into an overall risk assessment tool which takes the complex inter-
actions between domains in smart grid systems into account. We
have also presented a very simple example case to serve as a proof
of concept of the chosen approach, as well as a generic soware
framework for the processing of hypothesis templates. Both the
solution approach and the soware implementing it are currently
at an early stage of development. e next logical development
step is the application of the method to a more complex and more
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realistic scenario. A case has been developed in the SALVAGE
project which investigates possible aacks on the conguration of
protection devices in a medium voltage grid. e creation of an
appropriate hypothesis template for this system is planned. is
template will include several branching points, allowing the in-
vestigation of practical methods for mitigating the ”explosion of
hypotheses”. e applicability of the presented approach will to a
signicant degree depend on solutions for this issue. Further down
the road, the partial automation of hypothesis template design
presents an interesting challenge. Currently, hypothesis templates
have to be hand-craed by a group of domain experts covering all
domains. Identifying some low-hanging fruits to reduce the eort
would strengthen the viability of the approach.
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